1.1.3 A Matter of Standards

Why is the whiteness of snow a fact, but the flavor of sushi a personal taste? If we look deeper into this issue, we would see that both facts and values are a matter of standards. When there is a more or less commonly accepted standard, we tend to think that the issue is factual. But if a common standard is not needed or is lacking, then we would regard the issue as evaluative. People think that it is a fact that the sky is blue. This is because we take for granted that the standard for the colors of things is the normal human vision. By comparison, people are quick to acknowledge that it is not a fact that sushi tastes good. This is because we recognize that the standard for whether some food tastes good can vary widely from person to person. Moreover, most of us now think there is no need for a common standard regarding whether a food is tasty. This explains why we think “The sky is blue” is factual, but “Sushi is delicious” is not.

However, human vision is not without variation. Think of people with different types of colorblindness. This is why the standard for the colors of things needs to be qualified with the word “normal.” People with colorblindness are then stigmatized as abnormal. Notice the use of the words such as “normal” and “abnormal.” They make it clear that standards are involved even in a simple and straightforward example of what we tend to take for granted as facts.

To bring home the point even more, imagine that the majority of people, say 92 percent, see the sky as gray. Now who would be normal, and who would be abnormal? Most likely, those who do not see the sky as gray would be deemed abnormal. It is important to keep in mind that in this hypothetical case, there would still be a common standard for the colors of things, that is, the normal human vision. So the sentence “The sky is gray” is still a statement. However, what is regarded as the normal human vision would have changed. As a result, “The sky is blue” would no longer be true. To find out more about human vision and the color of the sky, read Peter Pesic’s article “Yes, It is Blue: But why?”

The history of taxonomy is full of examples that support our thesis that facts are a matter of standards. Quite often, when the standards for classification change, what is regarded as a scientific fact also changes. For example, if no-egg-laying is taken to be an important property in classifying an animal as mammal, then it would become a fact that mammals do not lay eggs. As a result, it would not be a fact that platypuses are mammals.²

In August 2006, the International Astronomical Union voted to revise the standards of planets. As a result, Pluto is no longer a planet. This is another illustration of our thesis that facts are a matter of standards.

When it comes to foods, the standards for taste vary much widely from culture to culture and person to person. This is why such a matter is taken to be a matter of preferences or values. It is quite conceivable that a Japanese person may be discriminated as abnormal in Japan if she dislikes sushi. But in general people have learned to be more tolerant when it comes to personal preferences for foods. Unfortunately people tend to be less tolerant when it comes to music and art, and much less so when it comes to morals. However, we do recognize that preferences for music, art and morals are a matter of values.

1.1.4 Facts or Values?

We have learned that standards are involved in our judgments about facts and values. If the standard is more or less agreed upon, then we are inclined to view it as a matter of fact; if not, a matter of value. This insight also helps us explain and appreciate why the distinction between fact and value is not always clear-cut. Whether there is a well-defined or commonly accepted standard is always a matter of degree.

For example, compare these two sentences

Most people, when asked, would say that (1a) is a statement, but (1b) is an evaluative sentence. But why is the difference considering that the two share the same syntax? When asked why they agree or disagree with either of the two, many would point out that it is a matter of what counts as a good basketball player and what counts as a good president. Some would attempt further to spell out the standards for good basketball players in terms of game statistics, but acknowledge that it is much harder to come up with numbers for a president’s job performance.³ This illustrates and reconfirms the thesis that both facts and values are a matter of standards. Furthermore, when there is a need for a common standard and a set of criteria come to be adopted as the norm, people would regard a judgment based on such a standard as factual; otherwise, they would deem it evaluative. It is also important to notice that to what extent a set of criteria are agreed upon as a common standard is a matter of degrees. Thus, the distinction between facts and values is never black and white.

To sum up the discussion so far,

1. Both factual and value judgments presuppose standards (or norms). In this sense, all of them are normative judgments.
2. Judgments with agreed upon standards are taken to be factual; judgments without such standards are deemed evaluative.
3. The acceptance of a standard is a matter of degrees that can vary from place to place and time to time.

The distinction between fact and value is still fairly common in daily language. But now we know that such a distinction is based on whether there are agreed upon standards. As long as we continue to make such a distinction, we should bear in mind that since all judgments presuppose some norms or standards, what we regard as factual is actually normative. The difference between fact and value lies in whether the standards are uncontroversial and commonly accepted. You can read the article “Relatively Speaking” by Simon Blackburn, who teaches philosophy at the University of Cambridge, to learn more about the philosophical issues related to the distinction between facts and values.

Let’s now apply what is discussed so far to help us distinguish statements from evaluative sentences:

It should be obvious that sentence (1c) is evaluative because people have different aesthetic standards. Sentence (1d) is a statement because the standard for what counts as life is well-established and accepted in science. (1e) is also a statement because the standard for violent behaviors, though to some extent fuzzy, is more or less established, or can be clearly defined in a scientific research. Another reason why (1d) and (1e) are factual is that gathering evidence is the key in settling disagreements on these issues. Sentence (1f) is evaluative because the standards for obscenity vary. As for sentence (1g), the controversy is precisely about the standards of what counts as a person. People who think there is a well-established and commonly-accepted standard of personhood would contend that the issue is factual. Without such a standard, sentence (1g) would have to be evaluative. Again, this reminds us that the distinction between statements and evaluative sentences is not always clear-cut.

If a sentence is a statement, then it is either true or false. For evaluative sentences, we should avoid calling them true or false. Otherwise, we end up with confusing talks such as “It is true for you, but not true for me.” When it comes to sushi, you may think it is OK to talk this way. But can you, with normal eyesight, say to someone that “The sky is blue” is true for her, but not true for you? Apparently not. For value judgments, it is better to say “I agree” or “I disagree.” Alternatively, we can say a normative judgment is acceptable or unacceptable.

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Exercise 1.1

 

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